The Injustice Gap: Proportionality and the Legitimacy of Transitional Justice Authorities in Iraq

Transitional justice scholarship expects accountability to rebuild institutional legitimacy after conflict, yet evidence for this claim is mixed. This article develops and tests a theory of when accountability builds or erodes legitimacy: I argue that mismatches between citizens’ proportionality judgments and imposed punishments create “injustice gaps,” with legitimacy maximized near proportionality and declining as gaps widen. I test this using a two-stage vignette experiment embedded in probability samples of 4,594 Iraqis across three governorates, randomizing punishment severity and the authority (state, tribal, or religious) that imposes it. Any injustice gap, whether underor overpunishment, reduces perceived legitimacy by nearly three-quarters of a standard deviation, with losses growing with gap size; state authorities appear especially vulnerable to large gaps compared with customary authorities, though e!ects vary by sectarian subgroup. These findings highlight a central tradeo! for transitional justice: accountability without proportionality can undermine the legitimacy it is meant to strengthen.